

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.180
2 April 1964
ENGLISH

THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

JUN 16 1964

DOCUMENT
COLLECTION

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTIETH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 2 April 1964, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

(Nigeria)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. J. De CASTRO

Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. LUKANOV

Mr. G. GHELEV

Mr. D. TEKHOV

Mr. G. YANKOV

Burma:

Mr. James BARRINGTON

U SAIN BWA

U HTOON SHEIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Mr. P.D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. ZEMLA

Mr. T. LAHODA

Mr. J. BUCEK

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Ato A. AGEDE

Ato S. TEFERRA

India:

Mr. R.K. NEHRU

Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Mr. G.R. SAPRA

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. E. GUIDOTTI

Mr. S. AVETTA

Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. Ernesto de SANTIAGO

Miss E. AGUIRRE

Mr. Manuel TELLO

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. LOBODYCZ

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. J. GOLDBLAT

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. M. IONESCU

Mr. I. IACOB

Sweden:

Mr. P. LIND

Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD

Mr. M. STAHL

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. I.G. USACHEV

Mr. V.V. SHUSTOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A. FATTAH HASSAN

Mr. A. OSMAN

Mr. M. KASSEM

Mr. S.E. IBRAHIM

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON

Mr. A.J. WILLIAMS

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United States of America:

Mr. A.S. FISHER

Mr. A.L. RICHARDS

Mr. D.S. MacDONALD

Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Nigeria): I declare open the one hundred and eightieth meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. DUMITRESCU (Romania) (translation from French): The Romanian delegation today wishes to deal with problems relating to certain collateral measures submitted for our consideration which it considers particularly suitable for joint action by the members of this Committee, since those measures fully meet the principles laid down during our talks.

The first of these principles -- and the most important -- is undoubtedly that a collateral measure should be capable of contributing to the achievement of general and complete disarmament. Secondly, we consider that it would not be out of place, when attempting to decide which collateral measure might be jointly studied in priority, to ask ourselves which involves the least difficulty in maintaining the balance of power between the various parties and in control. We should like to add another principle: that priority should be given to proposals the solution of which is not contingent on the existence or organization of peace-keeping machinery as a preliminary measure.

In my delegation's view, several of the measures before us accord with these principles. They are the reduction of military budgets, the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the States members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, and the establishment of denuclearized zones.

The Romanian delegation has given its views on denuclearized zones on several occasions, and has stressed the special importance which the Romanian Government attaches to this problem. This attitude is reflected, inter alia, in the Romanian proposal that the Balkans should be converted into a zone of peace and co-operation between peoples, a zone free from nuclear weapons (ENDC/PV.168, p.15). As is well known, the Romanian Government supports other similar proposals for establishing denuclearized zones in Europe and in other regions of the world.

The socialist delegations have expressed themselves in favour of discussing this question; the delegations of the uncommitted States in the Committee have also indicated their interest in such negotiations. I trust that the Western delegations, too, will agree to co-operate so that the Committee can examine this

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problem. We consider that this is a problem which is ripe for detailed analysis and which fully accords with the principles I have just mentioned. As we see it, the establishment of denuclearized zones would not entail any special difficulty in regard either to control or to the balance of power. It also prevents virtually no problem in regard to the establishment of special peace-keeping machinery.

I have followed with close attention the progress of our discussions on reducing military budgets. In the opinion of our delegation, our discussions have plainly shown that no arguments can be given to justify delay in solving this problem. The time seems to have come for concrete steps in this direction. The reduction of military budgets is certainly not a panacea, as I have already had occasion to point out. We cannot eliminate all our difficulties by that one step. We consider, however, that, by reason both of its intrinsic value and of the relative ease with which it can be carried into effect, it deserves special attention from this Committee.

Furthermore, a reduction of military budgets obviously raises no particular difficulties in regard either to control or to the balance of power; nor does it raise the question of establishing special machinery for the maintenance of peace. In other words, this collateral measure too meets all the criteria I have just listed.

Let us consider for a moment the vast resources that would become available to mankind if the \$120,000 million currently spent on armaments were used for the economic development of the nations. To obtain a clearer idea of the prospects which a reduction in military expenditure would open up for mankind, and to grasp the full significance and urgency of this problem, we need only spend a few minutes in the nearby meeting rooms where the Conference on Trade and Development is taking place. I am sure that the aims of that Conference could not fail to spur on our Committee.

We have concrete proposals before us. I am, of course, thinking first and foremost of the Soviet proposal for reducing the military expenditure of States by 10 to 15 per cent (ENDC/123). I also have in mind the Brazilian delegation's proposal for the use of resources released by disarmament (ENDC/126). There is also the well-informed opinion expressed by a United Nations group of experts in a report entitled Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament (E/3593/Rev.1),

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which gives figures and concrete examples to show that a reduction in military expenditure and even its elimination, far from being detrimental to the economy of States, could have only the most beneficial effects.

The idea of reducing military budgets is held to be feasible, as shown by the opinion recently expressed by Mr. Roswell Gilpatric, former Deputy Secretary of Defense in the United States Government; references to this opinion have already been made in the Committee (ENDC/PV.178, p.43). As we know, Mr. Gilpatric considers that United States military expenditure could be reduced by some 25 per cent by 1970. I need hardly say that this opinion was expressed by a man whose knowledge of United States military expenditure is incontestably authoritative. I think we can assume that, when Mr. Gilpatric suggested a reduction of some 25 per cent in United States military expenditure by 1970, he did not have in mind any weakening in the defence structure of the United States. The United States military budget can therefore be reduced by 25 per cent without affecting the balance of power, about which there has been so much discussion. True, Mr. Gilpatric does not speak of an annual reduction of 10 to 15 per cent, which is what most States present here certainly seem to be envisaging. Could that be the only reason why the United States delegation is still hesitating to give its views on the proposal for the reduction of military budgets?

In any case, all the necessary conditions are met for passing on to action and for achieving the practical, positive and immediate results desired by Mr. de Castro and, I hope, by all of us. That should be all the easier since successes have already begun to be recorded in this field.

I would remind the Committee in this connexion of the reductions which have been effected or announced by the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States, and of the reductions which have been decided on by other countries and reported to the Committee during this session. I should like to emphasize that, as we understand it, the reduction of military budgets is not a provisional measure. We could not agree to reductions carried out in one year being cancelled out by increased military expenditure in the next year.

We regard the reduction of military budgets as a continuous and irreversible process, which, pari passu with the execution of certain disarmament measures, will bring us steadily closer to a situation in which we can achieve general and complete disarmament. That is the essential meaning of the Moscow Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1),

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which we all regard as the beginning of a project to be continued and completed. Viewed from that angle, the reduction of military budgets appears to us to be a necessary further step in the same direction.

The Romanian delegation continues to attach great importance to the proposal by the socialist States which are parties to the Warsaw Treaty for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between these States and the States members of NATO (ENDC/77). Any tension between these two groups of States unquestionably worsens the political climate throughout the world. An improvement in these relations, a détente between these two groups, and a strengthening of security in Europe would be bound to have a favourable effect on international relations throughout the world. The Romanian Government, as it has stated several times, sees in the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the States signatories of the Warsaw Treaty and the countries members of NATO a transitional measure towards the ultimate liquidation of military blocs, which in turn would contribute to an improvement in the international situation, a strengthening of peace throughout the world, and the promotion of general and complete disarmament.

Clearly, the power relationships between the contracting parties -- indeed, between all other States -- would in no way be affected by the conclusion of a non-aggression pact. No one could reasonably maintain that the military alliances would be weakened by the conclusion of such a pact -- unless their aim is assumed to be aggressive. No party would be obliged to reduce the number of its weapons or men under arms, although, as a result of the relaxation of tension that would follow the conclusion of such a pact, serious possibilities of carrying out certain disarmament measures might be anticipated. That is precisely why, moreover, the conclusion of a non-aggression pact would be a collateral measure of disarmament.

In addition, the execution of this measure would not raise any problems of control. The proposed measure would be applied without any need for verification or inspection either inside or outside the territory of a State. The mere conclusion of the pact would have moral, political and legal effects: the States parties to the pact would reaffirm their obligation to refrain from committing acts of aggression against one another, with all the consequences which would ensue from such acts and which I need not describe in detail.

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Nor is there any need to show that the implementation of a non-aggression pact of the type proposed would not in any way require the establishment of machinery for the maintenance of peace. It is clear that, since the mere conclusion of a non-aggression pact imposes no obligation on the contracting parties to make changes in the capacity or structure of their defence systems, the problem of replacing the coercive power in the possession of certain States today by an international coercive power does not arise.

On the contrary, we are faced by one problem of especial urgency and gravity: that of improving the international political climate, reducing tension in relations between East and West, and promoting mutual trust among States and peoples. I do not think there is any need to lay special stress on the beneficial effects which the conclusion of a non-aggression pact would have in these respects.

It seems to me useful, however, to emphasize the positive significance of the conclusion of such a pact for the international security of European States and, indeed, of other States. In our day, the right course to safeguard the security of States -- a question which I recently discussed at some length (ENDC/PV.179, pp. 17,18) -- is to bring about a relaxation of tension, to promote mutual trust, and to establish peaceful and good neighbourly relations, and peaceful co-existence.

In conclusion, I should like to say how glad I am to see Mr. Nehru here again at the head of the Indian delegation.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): First of all, I should like to associate myself with the Romanian representative in welcoming Mr. Nehru back to our midst.

I listened with great interest to the statement just made by the representative of Romania and shall study it in the verbatim record. I should, however, like to raise a point now which I consider relevant. The Romanian representative said; if I understood him correctly, that one of the principles to be followed in drawing up collateral measures should be that of giving special attention and priority to proposals the solution of which is not contingent on the existence or organization of peace-making machinery as a preliminary measure. I find that principle, like those which we have discussed in the past, fully acceptable. Moreover, I do not believe that any of the proposals on collateral measures put forward by the Western delegations requires the preliminary or simultaneous establishment of peace-keeping machinery. I shall go even further: the preliminary establishment of peace-keeping machinery is not inherent in the actual concept of a collateral measure.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

Mr. Dumitrescu's statement is also interesting because it appears to indicate that in his view the establishment of peace-keeping machinery would be essential for other, large-scale measures such as the Gromyko proposal (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1), to take an example chosen by myself. We share that view, and I am very happy to find myself in agreement with the Romanian representative on this point.

The discussions of the last few days seem to me particularly important by reason both of the views expressed and of the high-level representation of the member countries of this Committee. Two Foreign Ministers, one from a non-aligned and the other from a NATO country, have expressed nearly identical views on the subject of this Conference. The Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada (ENDC/PV.178,p.23) and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Brazil (ENDC/PV.177, p.12) have both confirmed the importance of our work and expressed their confidence that our efforts will bear fruit. My delegation fully shares that view, which I hope corresponds to the general sentiment of this Committee regarding both general and complete disarmament and collateral measures.

The Committee has embarked on a far-reaching and valuable discussion of the latter subject, enabling it to examine a large number of proposals submitted by both sides. Once we have completed this comprehensive review, we shall have discovered the subjects or areas where we can most easily reach an understanding and where detailed studies should be made in order to work out agreements.

Meanwhile, new proposals have been added to those that were before us at the opening of this session. The United States delegation has submitted a proposal for the destruction of a certain type of bomber (ENDC/PV.176, pp. 5 et seq.); the Brazilian delegation has submitted other proposals on which I will comment briefly.

Mr. de Araujo Castro first drew the Committee's attention to the possibility of extending the nuclear test ban to certain categories of underground tests (ENDC/PV.177, p.9). Other representatives of non-aligned countries, in particular, Mr. Barrington of Burma, made a similar suggestion at one of our recent meetings (ENDC/PV.178, p.36). All those who followed our discussions last year are, of course, aware of the difficulties in that particular field. It is, however, obvious that we must not lose sight of the problem of banning underground tests, for it is still one of our objectives. As you know, the obstacles to agreement are essentially technical

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and it may well be asked whether, at this stage of the work of the Conference, a new objective confrontation of the positions of both sides and a realistic examination of the present situation would not be useful.

Mr. de Araujo Castro devoted particular attention (ENDC/PV.177, pp. 10 et seq.) to the assistance which disarmament would make it possible to give to developing countries. He stated the problem very correctly, making no reference to certain pressing and essential requirements. The process of general and complete disarmament must obviously, at a certain stage, result in the release of considerable economic resources; it would be entirely natural and in accordance with our aims to earmark part of these resources for the economic and social development of the less-privileged countries. No one could take exception to that view, certainly not my own country, which has always been particularly sensitive to the economic and social problems of developing countries and, within the limits of its resources, is doing everything possible to assist them.

In associating myself with the similar views expressed by other delegations, I should also like to express the wish that all countries should follow the example of the Soviet Union and the United States and make as soon as possible such savings in their military expenditure as are compatible with their security. This wish stems directly from our common desire to achieve general and complete disarmament; for the further we advance along the road to disarmament, the closer will each country's military expenditure come to zero. Thus it is that in the Western draft treaty a reduction in military expenditure finds an appropriate place in the process of general and complete disarmament (ENDC/30, p.11).

The question, of course, presents itself in an entirely different light if the reduction of military expenditure is regarded as a collateral measure to be implemented separately from and independently of any other disarmament measure. It is questionable whether that approach to the matter is valid in itself or would be a really effective means of achieving our objectives. We are here to destroy armaments, to diminish and then eliminate the danger of the arms race in a concrete and tangible manner. The financial consequences would merely be an indirect outcome of these operations, not the actual purpose of our work. A reduction of military budgets can, of course, serve as an illuminating and constructive indication and as a useful means

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of corroborating and verifying the effective decrease in military effort. That is why we warmly welcome the reductions made by the Soviet Union and the United States.

But in the absence of other guarantees, does a reduction of military budgets provide anything more than an indication or supplementary evidence? Would the reduction proposed by the Soviet delegation really ensure that the situation would become less dangerous from the military point of view? Discussion of budgets leads us into a highly complex subject which should be studied very carefully before an answer is given to such questions. In considering the structure and total amount of a military budget, many problems arise concerning the type of expenditure which is or is not included, and concerning the value of the currency itself. Major items such as the police force or war pensions, which have no connexion with the military effort, are often included in military budgets. Moreover, the value of a nation's currency directly affects a number of items in a military budget: for instance military pay, infrastructural works, and purchase of supplies abroad.

These few examples suffice to show the need to ponder the difficulties of assessing the real value of a reduction of military budgets. The concealment of military expenditure raises even more complex problems. It is quite possible, for instance, for the costs of scientific research for military purposes to be included in civilian budgets; a country which had made a small reduction in its total military budget might, through new discoveries financed by civilian ministries, achieve a break-through which would put a potential enemy at its mercy.

These are somewhat unrehearsed and elementary arguments, but they seem to me to demonstrate adequately why a collateral measure affecting military budgets cannot be envisaged without an exhaustive study of the problem with particular reference to two points: how to ensure that reductions of military budgets genuinely relate to the military effort, and how to verify that the accounting figures correspond to a concrete reduction in the military effort. Otherwise we should merely be encouraging financial manipulations or evasions which would in no way further our purpose. In this problem of military budgets, as in many others pertaining to armaments, we cannot make sweeping decisions without first undertaking the necessary work of preparation and analysis. Such work is absolutely essential if we are to arrive at sound solutions.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

The Western delegations have never sought, either in respect of collateral measures or of general and complete disarmament, to impose solutions without this indispensable preparatory work. On the contrary, they invite the Committee to make a thorough study of all the problems which each measure involves. This is particularly true of the proposals submitted by the Western delegations. Whether it is the cut-off, the freeze of strategic delivery vehicles, or observation posts, each of our proposals is submitted as a basis for study. We are willing to discuss each point in a flexible and understanding manner.

We were therefore glad to see that Mr. Zemla, the representative of Czechoslovakia, devoted a large part of his statement on 26 March to the Western proposal (ENDC/120) for freezing strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. (ENDC/PV.178, pp. 26 et seq.) Mr. Zemla is certainly very talented, but all his talents would not suffice for such a difficult task as that of demonstrating, as he attempted to do, that this freeze is completely useless and even harmful or dangerous. He first objected that the United States freeze proposal would not lead to the destruction of delivery vehicles. That is self-evident; it is indicated by the very word freeze. But to hear Mr. Zemla talk, one would think that the arms race will stop by itself and even that it has stopped already: the various countries are, it seems, no longer thinking of increasing the quantity or improving the quality of their strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. To demonstrate this, the representative of Czechoslovakia had recourse to cuttings from the Western Press. But his choice was not very convincing, for he quoted Newsweek, which, according to this same statement by Mr. Zemla, spoke of nuclear warheads, of which the United States is alleged to have an ample supply, but not of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. It seems to me that there is some difference between warheads and delivery vehicles.

Mr. Zemla then said that "... the 'freeze' proposal would not lead to the total discontinuance" of the "further production" of delivery vehicles (ibid., p.29). I should like to know on what Mr. Zemla bases that statement. Mr. Zemla went on to claim that we intended to exclude Polaris missiles from the freeze. There, again, I should like to know in which statement by a Western delegation he found an assertion to that effect.

(Mr. Cavalletti, (Italy))

Where control is concerned, Mr. Zemla seems to wish further clarification. There is no disagreement between us here. We are certainly willing to provide such clarification. We can, of course, work out together the detailed measures which are strictly necessary for effective control of the freeze. But on the basis of what has been said by the Western delegations, it is clearly not correct to assert, as Mr. Zemla did, that --

"Certain indications in the statements of the Western delegations... make it clear that the Western Powers would like to carry out such control measures in connexion with the proposed freeze as would make it possible for them practically to have access to the entire territories of other States." (ibid., p.30)

The "freeze" measures proposed by us do indeed entail a degree of control; Otherwise the "freeze" might be altogether ephemeral and illusory. The control should, however, be limited and not unduly irksome.

The socialist countries' argument seems to be that any investigation without the elimination of armaments is inadmissible; so, since the freeze does not entail this elimination, control is unacceptable. In my view this proposition should be re-examined. In reality the freeze is in itself a genuine measure of disarmament. It in fact prevents the further development of weapons, which, though potential, is nevertheless certain and inevitable. Without a concerted freeze, without an agreement, there can be no hope of the arms race coming to an end by itself. It is therefore quite justifiable to stipulate that some verification measures should be included in a blocking agreement.

The Eastern countries have also recognized the need for verification of a blocking agreement. The Gomulka plan, which is also a freeze proposal, in effect provides for control measures. Such measures should logically also be accepted for a much vaster and far-reaching freeze such as one covering all strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and all production of fissionable materials for military purposes. Naturally, the investigations prescribed by a freeze agreement must not be too cumbersome or rigid; they should be strictly limited to those necessary to ensure that there is no increase in armaments. They should not apply to existing weapons, but only to weapons that might be added to present stocks.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

As I see it, a first overall programme, which is effective and quite extensive, is beginning to emerge from the preliminary comprehensive study which the Committee has so far made of collateral measures, and is gaining the support of most delegations. Such a programme would be in the nature of a preliminary phase preceding the three stages of general and complete disarmament, and would give a powerful impetus to that process. This first group of measures might comprise three projects, to be executed by simultaneous and parallel action or by action staggered to meet practical and technical requirements, but in any case as rapidly as possible, and directed towards --

- (1) cessation of the arms race in certain sectors; in other words, a quantitative and qualitative freeze of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes;
- (2) the adoption of a reverse course in the same sectors; in other words, the transfer to civilian use of certain quantities of military fissionable materials, and the balanced and controlled destruction of certain types of armaments, beginning with B-47 and TU-16 bombers;
- (3) steps to ensure that the cessation of the arms race in those sectors is accompanied by an effective reduction of military expenditure.

This is only a bare outline of a scheme which could usefully be studied in greater detail. In that connexion, my delegation made the following statement on the subject of "freezing" and the "cut-off" at the meeting of 13 February:

"Moreover, these measures would not be without financial repercussions ... The blocking of certain expenditures would serve as a starting point for the solution of the problems with which the Brazilian representative is concerned. It seems to me that the closing of factories producing fissionable material for military purposes and for the development of strategic missiles, the most costly plants in the world, would result in savings and would represent a first step towards the total blocking and gradual reduction of military expenditure". (ENDC/PV.166, p.13)

(Mr. Cavallett, Italy)

In addition, the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada made the following statement at the meeting of 26 March:

"In this connexion I have noted that, in the view of the Soviet Union, while the stopping of production of strategic nuclear weapon carriers would immediately produce significant savings in one sector of the military expenditures of the greater Powers, there is a danger that the resources so liberated might be used to increase the numbers of short-range missiles and conventional weapons....Perhaps this could be prevented by introducing a verified system of budgetary limitations." (ENDC/FV.178, pp.18,19)

While fully aware of the difficulties involved in the study and assessment of military budgets to which I alluded at the beginning of my statement, I consider that it would be useful to have fuller information on the budgetary implications of the above freeze measures; we would thus obtain fresh proof of their importance and value.

I do not, of course, wish to disregard or underestimate all the other collateral measures on which agreement could rapidly be achieved and which could be included in this "pre-phase" of disarmament. They must, in my view, certainly include all the concrete and tangible measures which it is generally agreed could reduce mutual distrust. On 26 March, the United Kingdom delegation submitted a paper on observation posts (ENDC/130) on which I said that I would comment later. I shall now do so. I regard this paper as a useful working document of a general character which could, by common consent, be used to lay down certain principles for the establishment of observation posts. The idea of establishing observation posts was put forward again last summer by Mr. Khrushchev at the time of the signature of the Moscow Treaty. It is with pleasure and hope that we take up that idea again now.

Our proposal forms part of our efforts to reduce mutual distrust through improved mutual knowledge. The two formidable dangers of war by miscalculation and surprise attack may stem from the same causes: ignorance and suspicion. The establishment of the direct line between Moscow and Washington (ENDC/97) was a first step in a process aimed at consolidating peace through eliminating all possible misunderstandings and increasing each side's knowledge of the other's intentions. This process must be continued and developed. To that end we submitted several other proposals last year, and suggested the exchange of military information and the expansion of contacts between military circles.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

With a view to exploring all possible avenues to an agreement, we now propose the establishment of observation posts. As I see it, these posts, the detailed arrangements for which would, of course, have to be the subject of agreement, have an importance of their own, independently of any other disarmament measure. They would serve as a mutual pledge of sincerity, would better safeguard the security of all, and would strengthen peace.

The reply given to our proposal by Mr. Tsarapkin, the representative of the Soviet Union, on 26 March (ENDC/PV.178, p.53) was of course only his delegation's first reaction. I trust Mr. Tsarapkin will make a thorough study of the United Kingdom paper and, activated as he certainly is by a desire for collaboration and agreement, will give us his views later on.

I should like to request the two co-Chairmen to hold a preliminary private exchange of views on the United Kingdom paper and then to report to the Committee.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): Before beginning my main statement I should like to associate the United States delegation with the other delegations which have spoken in welcoming Mr. Nehru back to our table.

When this Conference reconvened on 21 January of this year, it received a five-point programme of collateral measures of disarmament from the President of the United States. Of these points the President said:

"Each one ... is important to peace. No one of them is impossible of agreement ... the United States is ready to conclude firm agreements

in these areas and to consider any other reasonable proposal." (ENDC/120, p.2)

Since that time the United States delegation has been explaining in greater detail the nature and practicability of these proposals. We have done so because we believe they merit careful and thorough consideration. To us this process seems essential if discussions in this Conference are to be directed into the channels most promising for further progress.

The Soviet Union has similarly laid before this Conference a memorandum (ENDC/123) containing proposals for collateral disarmament measures. We look forward to detailed explanations by the Soviet delegation of its proposals.

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

Today I should like to take stock of the proposals we have presented to the Conference thus far and the promise we believe they hold for early agreement. I should also like to consider certain objections thus far raised to our proposals -- objections which we believe to be ill-founded.

The United States has proposed a verified cut-off in the production of fissionable materials for weapons purpose and the transfer of substantial amounts of fissionable materials to non-weapons uses (ENDC/PV.166, pp.16 et seq.). We have taken the lead in this direction by deciding unilaterally to reduce our production of U-235 (ibid., p.19) Agreement on the proposal which we have made, in conjunction with a freeze of strategic delivery vehicles, could halt the nuclear arms race. That is an objective which I believe all members of this Conference -- including the Soviet Union -- regard as our main concern.

However, the objection has been voiced that, since nuclear stockpiles are not affected, additional nuclear weapons could be produced. I submit that that is an unrealistic objection. The United States proposes to begin disarmament in those areas where action is most practical for implementation and verification under current circumstances and where, at the same time, such action is consistent with the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (ENDC/5). Practicability and prospect of accomplishment must be our criteria, not instant perfection.

The United States has made a number of proposals to halt the spread of nuclear weapons to nations not now controlling them. These proposals would be important additions to the limited test ban treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1). We have proposed exploration of the possibilities of agreement on the application of safeguards, such as those of the International Atomic Energy Agency, to transfers of fissionable materials and related equipment for peaceful purposes (ENDC/PV.172, pp.14 et seq.). We have stressed the importance of such a programme as a means of minimizing the possibilities of the development of additional national nuclear weapon capabilities. As proof of our desire to make progress in this area we have set an example by offering to open to IAEA inspection the large Yankee power reactor in Rowe, Massachusetts (ibid., p.17).

We have also, as the Committee knows, been discussing privately with the Soviet Union a proposed agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons based on the Irish resolution (A/RES/1665 (XVI)) adopted unanimously by the sixteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly. In this connexion we have made it clear, here and elsewhere, that the United States does not intend to take any action inconsistent with the Irish resolution.

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

There is general agreement, I believe, that prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons to nations not now controlling them is an urgent matter. But an effort is being made to becloud this issue with essentially political arguments against the projected multilateral force. On 26 March, the representative of the Soviet Union made some observations about the plans for a multilateral force (ENDC/PV.178, pp. 44 et seq.). His statements appeared to convey the impression that the continued execution of the plan for the multilateral force would create difficulties concerning the wide range of measures to curb the proliferation of national nuclear forces which were set forth in President Johnson's message of 21 January to this Conference. I hope that this interpretation of the Soviet representative's remarks is not correct. There is nothing in the plans for the multilateral force that interferes with the United States proposals to curb proliferation.

The multilateral force is being devised to enable Western European members of the Alliance jointly with the United States to cope with, and hence to deter, the wide range of possible threats that they face. In particular, it is being devised to provide a responsibly-controlled deterrent in the face of a Soviet nuclear threat which includes hundreds of medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles, armed with nuclear warheads and aimed at the densely-populated cities and industrial areas of Western Europe. The multilateral force will contribute to meeting this threat in a way which avoids the creation of new national centres of control over nuclear weapons. As such, it is fully consistent with the United States policy against proliferation of independent national nuclear forces.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk recently described such a force by stating that it "... would enable our allies to play a self-respecting role in nuclear deterrence without proliferating national nuclear forces." The agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons which we have been discussing with the Soviet Union would provide a further guarantee that the multilateral force would not result in the proliferation of national nuclear forces.

We believe that the various non-dissemination proposals we have suggested are as practical as they are urgent; they are steps that we can take now. One might ask: does the Soviet reaction mean that we cannot take any of these vital steps, because of the Soviet attitude towards the multilateral force? -- an attitude which, I submit, is based on erroneous premises. I strongly hope that no such obstacle is being put in the way of progress in this area.

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

The United States has also proposed the physical destruction of an equal number of B-47 and TU-16 bombers over a two-year period (ENDC/PV.176, pp.5 et seq.). We have explained how, in the context of arms control and disarmament, the physical destruction of these formidable aircraft would be highly preferable to their simple retirement from operational service by the unilateral action of both sides. Let me summarize the reasons for this, and it can be done very simply. Destruction is final; the aircraft destroyed cannot be reactivated. Destroyed aircraft cannot be passed on to other countries, now or in the future. Moreover, an agreement on this practical measure would provide valuable experience in carrying out an arms reduction agreement with verification, however simple that verification might be.

But this proposal has been opposed (ibid., pp. 30 et seq.) on the ground that it is not a significant disarmament measure. We are told that we should destroy untold quantities of bombers. We do not yet know whether this means all bombers, of all countries; but we do know that, if this is the proposal, it is not a realistic approach. Should we not begin now with what is practicable, instead of insisting on the millennium today?

Last Thursday the United Kingdom put forward concrete suggestions (ENDC/130) -- as a basis for discussion of a system of observation posts -- which could do much to ease international tension by providing reliable and timely assurance about the military movements of each side. Such a suggestion, in and by itself, could reduce the risk of war. But this proposal met the objection (ENDC/PV.178, pp. 53, 54) that it contained nothing new and that it should be linked with other measures, each of which revives old controversies and presents major political and military difficulties.

Actually there is something new in the United Kingdom paper -- the simple idea that observation posts should first of all be examined on their merits. One might ask: cannot the Soviet Union, which advocates the linking of this measure with other measures, lay aside its conditions long enough to explore the question of posts on its merits? We are not asking for prior agreement in principle to this approach; we ask only that it be considered without conditions, so that we can all find out what it is to which the Soviet Union proposes to link other measures.

Let me now turn briefly to the proposal we have made to explore the question of a verified freeze of strategic nuclear vehicles. Such a freeze would be a practical means to bring to a halt the most costly and potentially-destructive segment of the

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arms race -- the very area in which, as the representative of Poland pointed out on 31 March, progress in the development of destructive capability has been most rapid (ENDC/PV.179, p. 6). We believe such a freeze is practicable. It could be realized in the near future. It would not jeopardize anyone's security; on the contrary, it would lay the groundwork for an improved political climate and would greatly facilitate progress towards general and complete disarmament.

But, again, we have been told that this is not disarmament and that it does not include all nuclear delivery vehicles. Those are the sorts of objections one could raise against almost any proposal we could realistically hope to implement in present circumstances. The proposed freeze would not, we admit, bring the millennium. It takes practical account of the real world in which we live. Is it not, therefore, worth exploring?

The situations I have outlined have one thing in common: the consideration of the merits of concrete and important proposals is impeded by insistence on the part of some delegations that there should be prior agreement to much wider more contentious or even wholly impractical measures or conditions. Is this Conference going to adopt the position that we should refrain from taking the practical, concrete steps now open to us because there is disagreement on the wisdom or practicability of taking other steps as well? Should we do nothing while we debate the wisdom of doing more?

The measures to which I have referred are ones on which we can make a start now. They would, if agreed upon, be important milestones in halting vital sectors of the arms race, in preventing the dissemination of nuclear weapons to the national control of States not now controlling them, in lessening the risk of war, and in beginning the actual process of arms reduction. We submit that measures of such a nature deserve our urgent attention. Some are modest in scope; others are broad enough to tax fully our ingenuity in turning them into agreed understandings. All of them seem to us to be worthy of study on their merits.

During the past two weeks several speakers have deplored the lack of accomplishment so far at this session. It is, of course, true that we cannot yet point to any concrete agreement. We have, however, the example of last year to show that, although disarmament proposals are slow to mature, agreements are possible with hard work and good will.

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

For its part, the United States sees no grounds for pessimism. At this stage in our work this year, it is the direction in which we are moving, rather than the number of agreements reached, by which we should judge our progress. We have before us a larger number of promising and practical proposals than ever before. When agreements emerge from these proposals, as I believe they will, they will constitute solid achievements, not empty phrases.

I believe we have before us the prospect of another fruitful year which will maintain the momentum achieved last year. If we are to realize this prospect, I would urge that we address ourselves to the merits of the proposals before us. Let us concentrate on those collateral measures which can be implemented now. The United States delegation is convinced that we can find a large area of agreement on the various measures now before this Committee. With good will and hard work on our part, 1964 may indeed be the year for which the President of the United States hoped -- a year which is one which future generations will mark --

"... as the year the world turned for all time away from the horrors of war and constructed new bulwarks of peace" (ENDC/120, p.1)

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I should like to associate myself with the words of welcome addressed to Mr. Nehru, the representative of India, who is with us again after a month's absence.

The Soviet delegation considers it necessary to return briefly to the question of reducing military budgets. We note with satisfaction the increasing support in the Committee for the Soviet Union's proposal (ENDC/123) that agreement be reached on a 10 to 15 per cent reduction of military budgets.

At the meeting on 24 March Mr. de Araujo Castro, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Brazil, said in his interesting statement that this proposal "deserves careful consideration" (ENDC/PV.177, p. 11). He essentially supported the idea of reducing military budgets, since, in the proposal put forward by Brazil for increased economic assistance to the developing countries (ENDC/126) the reduction of military budgets is regarded as the basis for this assistance, as the source of the funds and resources required for its realization. Two days later, on 26 March, Mr. Paul Martin, the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, expressed his conviction that "all nations would welcome a reduction of military expenditures". (ENDC/PV.178, p. 18) At the same meeting Mr. Barrington, the representative of

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Burma, with his characteristic thoroughness, gave arguments to support the conclusion that, given goodwill, agreement could be reached on the reduction of military budgets and the verification of such reductions (ibid., p. 34).

It should be noted that, as the course of the discussion indicates, it is, generally speaking, the Western participants in the Committee who are impeding the working-out of an agreement on the reduction of military budgets. This is not true of all of them, however, but only of the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom and also, it would seem, Italy, to judge by the statement made today by Mr. Cavalletti, who was obviously trying to substitute the problem of the technical study of State budgets for the problem of a reduction in military expenditure.

Mr. Thomas, the United Kingdom representative, attempted on 26 March to avoid giving a direct reply to the proposal for a reduction of military budgets, taking refuge behind a verbal barricade. Mr. Thomas stated:

"... it is not enough to agree on phrases or ambiguous forms of words. The world wants a solid machine, not a paper model; and

for that we need blueprints, not an artist's sketch". (ENDC/PV.178, p. 6)

When we consider his statement closely, we cannot help feeling serious doubts. Is this really what Mr. Thomas wants? Does he really want a solid machine and blueprints, as he has stated? Let us look at what is happening in reality. The Soviet Union submitted a specific proposal, giving specific figures. We proposed reducing military expenditure, the military budgets of States, by 10 to 15 per cent. To use Mr. Thomas' metaphor, we submitted a blueprint and not an artist's sketch. We invited all the members of the Committee, including the Western Powers, jointly to consider and approve this blueprint, thereby opening up the way to agreement. The question arises: who is declining to consider the blueprint before us and then to carry out a reduction of military budgets in accordance with that proposal? The answer is obvious to everyone, including Mr. Thomas. It is the Western Powers -- the United States and the United Kingdom.

Mr. Thomas has assumed an impossible task in attempting to whitewash the policy of the United Kingdom Government, which is increasing its military expenditure and speeding up the arms race. Last time he was here he told us:

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"At present the gross defence expenditure of the United Kingdom, according to the figures we publish, is going up, while the gross defence expenditure of the Soviet Union, according to the figures it publishes, is going down".

The United Kingdom representative went on to ask the question:

"Does that mean that the Soviet Union is halting the arms race and that we are urging it on?" (ibid., p.7)

The answer, I think, is obvious to everyone: the arms race is being urged on by those who are allocating more and more funds to military preparations. The fact stares us all in the face that this year the United Kingdom Government is feeding £162 million more into the military machine than in the previous budget year. This is a fact. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, appropriated 600 million roubles less for defence in the current than in the previous budget year.

I would draw attention to the way in which the United Kingdom representative believes he can obscure this fact. He does not talk about reducing military expenditure, but about studying a whole series of technical questions. He invites us to go with him into the laboratory, obviously in order to confuse matters and to turn black into white. Such a laboratory might produce the theory that an increase in military budgets represents a reduction in military expenditure, while a reduction of military budgets represents an increase in military expenditure. This is exactly what Mr. Thomas was trying to tell us at the 178th meeting.

Generally speaking, the situation in our Committee on the question of reducing military budgets is absolutely plain and clear-cut. That proposal has the support of the overwhelming majority of the Committee. It is all the easier to implement in that a number of States have already actually started making reductions in their military budgets. The obstacle to agreement in the Committee is the position of the Western Powers, though not all of them. This applies not only to the United States but also to the United Kingdom Government, which, in defiance of world public opinion and in disregard of the wishes of its own people, is still pursuing the policy of the arms race, the policy of increasing military expenditure, of intensifying military preparations.

I would point out to Mr. Thomas -- he is not here today but I hope he will read this statement -- that all this is being done contrary to the provisions of the

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joint communiqué of the three Powers -- the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America and the United Kingdom -- published on 25 July 1963 simultaneously in Moscow, Washington and London. You will remember that this communiqué contains the following statement:

"The heads of the three delegations agreed that the test ban treaty constituted an important first step towards the reduction of international tension and the strengthening of peace, and they look forward to further progress in this direction". (ENDC/101, p.2)

We appeal to the Western Powers to keep in mind these words set down in the document signed by their representatives; we shall then certainly make some progress in our negotiations.

During the discussion all the members of the Committee have agreed that we must make persistent efforts to reach agreement on measures that would facilitate a slackening of the arms race and make a serious contribution to the further relaxation of international tension. The memorandum of the Government of the USSR, which was submitted to this Committee on 28 January 1964 (ENDC/123), contains a proposal for the reduction of the total numbers of the armed forces of States. The Soviet Union Government has always been in favour of reducing the armed forces of States, regarding this as an effective means of achieving the goal of lessening the danger of war. It is obvious to everyone that a reduction of the total numbers of armed forces not only provides convincing evidence of the absence of aggressive intentions on the part of States taking this step, but also has direct advantages for such States. Young people in the prime of life return to civilian occupations, civilian employment, thereby adding to the economic resources of the State, country and nation.

The Soviet Union has on several occasions made considerable reductions in its armed forces, including unilateral reductions. We are profoundly convinced that at the present time circumstances are more favourable for solving the problem of reducing the total numbers of the armed forces of States on a reciprocal basis, without waiting for the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament to begin.

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As has been stated by Mr. N.S. Khrushchev, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union has now proceeded to a further reduction in the numbers of its armed forces. We have already indicated that the Soviet Government is prepared to go still further in the direction of reducing the numbers of its armed forces, if the Governments of the Western Powers show willingness to take similar measures. It is easy to imagine how greatly it would simplify the Committee's task in solving the other issues before it, including general and complete disarmament, if we succeeded in reaching agreement on a general reduction in the armed forces of States. The Soviet Union will try to contribute by every possible means to the working out of such an agreement. We occupy a flexible position and are ready either to conclude a formal agreement or to agree on a reduction of the total numbers of armed forces on the basis of a policy of mutual example. We hope that the members of the Committee will support that proposal and will soon state their views on the subject during our further discussion.

As the discussion in the Committee proceeds, the drawbacks of the United States proposal for the destruction of some obsolete bombers (ENDC/PV.176, pp. 5 et seq.) is becoming increasingly evident to the members of the Committee. In fact the purpose of this United States proposal is essentially to pass off the modernization of armed forces, the building up of their fighting strength, as a disarmament measure, and to cloak this modernization with the authority of the Committee, the authority of an international agreement on disarmament. Obsolete bombers, as Mr. Barrington, the representative of Burma, correctly pointed out, would be replaced by more modern means of delivery (ENDC/PV.178, p.35).

In contrast to this United States proposal there is the Soviet proposal for the elimination of all bomber aircraft. The purpose, significance and value of this proposal consist in the fact that it completely removes one of the basic means of delivering nuclear weapons. It is obvious that the implementation of our proposal would help to strengthen peace. If bomber aircraft, one of the principal means of delivering nuclear weapons, were eliminated before a solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament was reached, the possibility of the outbreak of a nuclear war could be substantially curtailed even before the conclusion of an agreement on general and complete disarmament. This proposal by the Soviet Union is an effective measure of actual disarmament. Agreement on this measure would greatly reduce international tension and create more favourable conditions for solving the main problem -- that of general and complete disarmament.

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The objections voiced by the Western representatives, in particular by Mr. Fisher, are surprisingly inconsistent. Mr. Fisher told us here that he sees a difficult problem in distinguishing between bombers and transport aircraft (ENDC/PV.176, p.7). We consider this argument to be artificial and far-fetched. No such difficulties would in fact arise in implementing the Soviet proposal; specialists and even non-specialists find no particular difficulty in distinguishing between sheep and goats. In general, the United States approach to the choice of disarmament measures and the United States concept of balance involve a double standard.

Any Soviet proposal aimed at reducing the threat of a new war, at lessening international tension, at a speedy and just agreement on general and complete disarmament, is rejected by the Western Powers on the ground that it allegedly upsets the balance between the forces of East and West. Nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles cannot be reduced, so they say, because the remaining conventional armaments would be unbalanced. On the other hand, there can be no reduction in the strength of armed forces because this would upset the structure of the armed forces. Military bases cannot be destroyed because this would disturb the correlation of forces between East and West; and, for the same so-called reason, foreign troops cannot be withdrawn from the territories of other countries, etcetera, etcetera. They substitute for all this measures which, as is evident from the statements made by the Western representatives themselves, would in fact disturb the correlation of forces, but to the advantage of the West. It is obvious that such an approach to the maintenance of balance is incompatible with disarmament, whatever metaphors about "balloons" or "motor-cars" may be used to reinforce it. This is not disarmament, but juggling with the word "disarmament".

I should like to return to the United States proposal for the destruction of B-47 bombers. A question arises in connexion with this proposal: why the representative of the United States is trying to institute a discussion on the subject. It is after all common knowledge that the United States B-47 bomber is an obsolete type, no longer corresponding to present needs, and that the United States Government long ago took the decision to withdraw it from service. In fact, as is clear from an announcement made by the Defense Department of the United States on 8 November 1963, the United States has been gradually withdrawing this aircraft from service since 1959, and only half the original number now remain.

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All this is natural and understandable. The B-47 has had many predecessors, and all of them, as and when they have become obsolete, have been withdrawn, destroyed and replaced by new and better aircraft without arousing special interest, as a matter of routine action by the Pentagon. But for some reason the United States attitude to the remaining half of the B-47 bombers has changed. A special preference is being accorded to these remaining B-47 aircraft, a preference which, in our opinion, is completely unwarranted.

It is obvious to everyone that the United States side has made its proposal for the destruction of the obsolete B-47 aircraft, not for the purpose of disarmament, but for the purpose of accelerating the re-equipment of its air force by introducing technically-superior machines and intensifying the armaments race still further. Three months ago General Limey, the Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, said in Los Angeles on 17 December 1963 that aero-cosmic machines should be and are effective weapons of national policy over the whole spectrum of hostile activities from cold war to total nuclear war. At one end of the spectrum these machines may simply be transport machines, but at the other end of the spectrum aero-cosmic systems of weapons are a means of waging nuclear war.

As you see, the range of use and development of so-called aero-cosmic equipment in the United States is very wide. We know that the United States has developed and is bringing into service new types of aircraft -- the A-11, the F-111a bomber and the prototype TFX. There is a ten-year programme called "Forecast" and a programme called "Project Lamp". The most advanced aircraft are being developed, including both those flying at high speeds and low altitudes and those flying at low speeds but with a very long range, as well as many other aircraft and complete systems which leave far behind not only such an "antique" as the B-47, but many other types as well.

In the course of the discussion some representatives pointed out that it would be difficult for countries which do not possess a wide range of military equipment to agree to destroy their bomber aircraft at once, without further delay. We consider that our proposal for the elimination of bomber aircraft naturally applies

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to all States. It is possible, however, to find a flexible formula under which we might agree, for instance, that the Great Powers, which possess the most powerful armed forces and armaments, should be the first to proceed to the implementation of the proposal for the elimination of bomber aircraft. We believe that this difficulty can be overcome in this way.

At our last meeting we dealt with the question of observation posts, and today I should like to make a few further remarks on this subject. The Soviet Union considers that, without the simultaneous withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the most explosive area — the territory of the two German States — and without the reduction of the number of foreign troops on territories of European States, the establishment of observation posts would not solve the problem of preventing a surprise attack. Without the measures I have mentioned, the work of such observation posts would essentially amount to legalized espionage, which could only increase mistrust and suspicion, exacerbate the existing situation, and even help to bring about a military clash.

"It is pointless for Mr. Fisher to try to give the impression that "...both sides have suggested that such a system of observation posts would reduce the risk of war" (ENDC/PV.178, p.37). We, I repeat, have never subscribed to this view and do not subscribe to it now. The arguments to which the United States and United Kingdom representatives have resorted in order to justify the establishment of observation posts in isolation from effective measures to reduce the danger of war are strikingly unconvincing and inconsistent. It is characteristic, however, that in his final statement, Mr. Thomas was forced to admit that these observation posts would do little good in themselves. At the meeting on 26 March Mr. Thomas said:

"It would, of course, be going altogether too far to suggest that even the most far-reaching system of observation posts could of itself prevent war if anyone were so mad as deliberately to embark upon it". (ibid., p.11)

We see in this remark by Mr. Thomas an admission that the observation posts in themselves would not save us from war or from surprise attack. What has to be done to make the observation posts really useful? The military situation must be eased and the madmen mentioned by Mr. Thomas must be deprived of the means of starting

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a war. This is the purpose of our proposal that, simultaneously with the establishment of observation posts, nuclear weapons should be withdrawn from the territory of both German States, the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, and foreign military forces at present stationed in European States should be reduced. This is the right course, the one which the Eighteen-Nation Committee should follow.

I should like to say a few words in connexion with today's statement by Mr. Fisher, the United States representative, on the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. It is quite clear from this statement that the United States prefers a nuclear alliance with the West German Bundeswehr to an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. This is, of course, regrettable, since such an attitude on the part of the United States runs counter to the idea of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. It is incompatible with that idea and is, I need hardly say, an obstacle to the conclusion of an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons.

The CHAIRMAN (Nigeria): On behalf of the Committee I should like to extend a hearty welcome to Mr. Nehru of India, who has returned to our midst. I should also like to wish bon voyage to Mr. Barrington of Burma, who is leaving us to take over one of his numerous posts. I should like to welcome in advance U Sain Bwa, who will replace Mr. Barrington.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 180th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of Mr. L.C.N. Obi, representative of Nigeria.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Romania, Italy, the United States and the Soviet Union.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 7 April 1964, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.